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Overview 
We have come to expect that each generation will be better off 
than its parents: wealthier, healthier and better housed. But the 
world is changing. Today's generation of young Australians may 
have lower standards of living than their parents at a similar age. 
Over the last decade, older households captured most of the 
growth in Australia's wealth. Despite the global financial crisis, 
households aged between 65 and 74 today are $200,000 
wealthier than households of that age eight years ago. 
Meanwhile, the wealth of households aged 25 to 34 has gone 
backwards. 
In part, the wealth of generations has diverged because of the 
boom in housing prices. Older households made big capital gains. 
With lower and falling rates of home ownership, younger 
households shared less of this windfall.  
Incomes also grew fastest for older Australians, allowing them to 
add more to their wealth by saving. Households aged 55-64 
saved $12,000 in 2010, up from $1000 in 2004. Households aged 
25 to 34 controlled their spending just as tightly, but their savings 
only increased to $11,000 in 2010 from $4000 in 2004, because 
their incomes did not rise as much. 
Governments are also spending much more on older households 
for pensions and services, particularly health. In 2010, 
governments spent $9400 more per household over 65 than they 
did six years before. Budget deficits funded much of the increased 
spending. Future taxpayers will have to repay the debt, dragging 
further on the prosperity of younger generations. 
In the past, each generation took out more from the budget over 
its lifetime than it put in. This generational bargain was 
sustainable when incomes rose quickly, as they did for 70 years.  
Yet government transfers from younger to older cohorts are now 
so large that future budgets may not be able to afford them as the 
population ages. In other words, the generational bargain is at 
risk. Many expect that incomes will rise more slowly over coming 
decades. If so, the last decade in the United States and Britain 
illustrates the potential outcomes. The wealth and incomes of 
younger age groups in these countries have fallen behind those of 
their parents at a similar age. 
Although older generations will ultimately pass on much of their 
accumulated wealth, this may not help younger generations 
much. On current trends, inheritances are typically received later 
in life and primarily benefit those who are already wealthy. Gifts to 
younger generations are typically small, and also primarily benefit 
well-off households. 
Governments can choose to prevent the next generation being 
worse off than its parents. Targeting the Age Pension, reducing 
superannuation tax concessions and shifting towards asset taxes 
could reduce the transfers between today's younger taxpayers 
and older retirees. These reforms would fall most on those who 
have benefited from windfalls, government largesse, and paying 
lower taxes while deficits accumulated. And we shouldn’t delay: 
later implementation may leave a younger generation even worse 
off, as they miss out on the benefits their parents enjoyed. 
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1 Introduction 
This report examines how the economic position of Australians of 
different ages is changing. It analyses trends in household wealth, 
incomes, and government taxes and transfers by age groups. It 
identifies which age groups are benefiting most from economic 
and policy changes. 
1.1 “Generations” and “age groups”: key concepts for this 
report  
The report considers the economic position of people of different 
ages at different points in time.  
A generation or birth cohort refers to a cohort of individuals born 
at roughly the same time. People remain members of one 
particular generation throughout their life. There is no fixed 
method for determining the bounds of an individual generation, 
though the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) tends to use a 
20-year range. A more accurate range might be 29 years – the 
median age at which a woman today has her first child.1 
An age cohort is the group of people within a particular age 
bracket at a given point in time. For example, the 20 to 24 year 
old cohort in 2004 includes all those people born between 1980 
and 1984. The same cohort in 2010 includes everyone born 
between 1986 and 1990.  
In this report we mainly consider the economic circumstances for 
a particular age group at different points in time. In other words, 
                                            
1 ABS (2013b) 
we compare the outcomes for different generations when they are 
at the same age. It is not particularly noteworthy that older people 
tend to earn more and to have accumulated more wealth than 
younger people. However, it is noteworthy if the income of a 
subsequent generation is lower than the income of a previous 
generation when they were at the same age.  
1.2 The drivers of future prosperity 
Lifetime economic well-being depends on consumption 
opportunities across different stages of a household’s lifecycle. 
The long term economic position of households depends on a 
number of factors: 
x net wealth – the store of resources that can be spent in future – 
which depends on past savings, plus appreciation in asset 
values; 
x future income;  
x future government spending and its incidence by age; 
x future taxes – which depend on future government spending, 
plus any liability to repay accumulated government debt; and 
x future inheritances and gifts. 
This report is about how these factors have evolved, and might 
develop in the future.  
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1.3 How the report analyses prosperity by age group 
The overall wealth of generations is discussed in Chapter 2. The 
wealth of households, particularly those over 45, has increased as 
a result of increasing house prices and a big jump in savings. 
Government benefits and services also increased over the last 
decade, particularly for households over 65, as Chapter 3 
describes. Twenty-year trends suggest that government 
spending on health services will continue to increase much 
faster than GDP.  
Over the last two decades, the dollar value of taxes also 
increased, but not as much as spending. As a result, budget 
deficits increased, implicitly imposing significant increases in 
future taxes on younger households. 
Future income depends primarily on economic growth rates, 
discussed in Chapter 4. Higher levels of income growth also make 
it easier to save. There are substantial risks that future income 
growth will be much slower than for recent decades.  
Older generations may either consume or save their wealth. 
Wealth that is saved will ultimately contribute to the future 
economic resources of younger generations when it is passed on 
as inheritances and gifts. However, as we discuss in Chapter 5, 
many households never receive anything; most bequests are only 
received later in life; and large bequests are primarily received by 
those who are already well-off.  
If the cost of government benefits and services continues to rise, if 
governments accumulate significant debts, and if income growth 
is sluggish, then a younger generation can find itself poorer than 
its parents at a similar age. The experiences of the United States 
and United Kingdom over the last decade provide a cautionary 
guide to how low or no economic growth can produce poor 
economic outcomes for younger cohorts, as Chapter 6 describes.  
Government can affect these factors through age-based 
government welfare, other spending, and taxes, particularly Age 
Pension benefits and superannuation tax concessions. 
Governments can also affect the prosperity of one generation 
relative to another through budget policy. If a government has 
budget deficits and accumulates debt, it will affect future taxes 
and services.  
Whether a younger generation is ultimately worse off than its 
parents will depend on policy change, the state of government 
finances, and economic growth. Chapter 7 outlines future work to 
analyse the budget impact of different growth scenarios and 
consider how plausible policy changes might affect the 
prosperity of younger generations relative to their parents.  
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1.4 Different stories for different ages: what explains the 
changing wealth of the old and young 
A snapshot of changes over the last decade indicates how much 
changes in the economy and government policy have affected the 
long-term economic position of households. By looking at swings 
historically, we can understand which of these factors is likely to 
be most important to the economic outcomes for future 
generations.  
Box 1: The components of wealth  
Changes in household wealth depend on saving, changes in the 
value and mix of assets (predominantly owner-occupied housing 
and superannuation) and liabilities. Other sources of changes in 
wealth include higher education loans and inheritances and gifts.  
Figure 1.1 shows the average annual change in wealth between 
2003-04 and 2009-10 from each of these sources.  
Figure 1.1 also shows how changes in government debt can 
affect the future tax liabilities of households. For consistency, we 
examine average annual debt accumulated by governments 
between 2003-04 and 2009-10. The debt is distributed among 
households by age group based on their estimated future share of 
taxes, assuming the historical distributions of taxes by age group 
remain the same and that the debt is paid down over 15 years.  
To show how much government debt per household grew 
annually between 2009-10 and 2013-14, the cost per household 
of paying down debt over this period is separately identified.  
Figure 1.1: Big changes in household balance sheets were a 
consequence of savings, capital appreciation and government debt 
Average annual change, 2014$ ‘000s 
 
Notes: Savings are calculated as average expenditure on goods and services less 
disposable income between 2003-04 and 2009-10. The increase in HECS debt is 
calculated from information on existing HECS liability provided in the 2003-04 and 2009-10 
HES. Savings from gifts and inheritance are based on average value of gifts and 
inheritance in a given year, with the assumption that this income is saved at the same rate 
as other income sources (HILDA survey). Changes in government debt per household are 
calculated as the total change in general government debt (Commonwealth, state and 
territory). These changes are then apportioned to households based on their estimated 
share of total tax liabilities for the next 15 years (Box 1). Households’ savings rates are 
positively skewed. To limit the impact of this skew on our analysis, we remove the lowest 
and highest deciles. 
Source: Grattan analysis based on HILDA (2012), ABS (2011b), ABS (2011a) and 
Treasury (2013a) 
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Over the last six years, the wealth of households headed by those 
55 to 65 and 65+ year olds increased faster than households in 
any other age group. These households saved more but they 
mainly benefited from capital appreciation (particularly rising 
house prices). Households headed by someone over 65 will be 
relatively unaffected by the increase in government debt that 
accumulated over this period. Retirees, who pay much less in 
taxes, are unlikely to contribute much to paying off the debt. 
By contrast, the financial position of 25 to 34 year old 
households barely improved. These households did not benefit 
in the same way from the windfall gains in housing because most 
bought at the end of the boom if they bought at all. Although they 
had higher HECS debts than their predecessors (as a result of 
higher HECS charges and participation rates), the impact of 
changes in these debts on overall wealth was relatively small.  
Because government debt increased rapidly, particularly since 
2008, younger households will pay substantially higher future 
taxes than would otherwise be the case. Younger households 
could face an additional $10,000 tax burden associated with each 
year of growing debt between 2010 and 2014. 
Some of this debt was due to cyclical deficits that may have 
helped maintain incomes during the economic downturn. But 
there is also a sizeable structural component – the 
Commonwealth Government had structural budget deficits of 
more than two per cent of GDP for the past five years (Chapter 3). 
The annual increase in future tax liability outweighs the annual 
savings of 25-34 year old households. 
The remainder of this report explores these components of 
changes in economic prosperity in more detail.  
1.5 What the report does not do 
The report focuses on indicators of financial wellbeing.  
Other economic, social and environmental changes will also 
affect the future welfare of today’s young. Higher youth 
unemployment may lead to long run unemployment, blighting the 
economic prospects of many who try to enter the workforce when 
unemployment rates are relatively high. Yet while current rates of 
youth unemployment are high, they are still below those that 
persisted for several years in both the 1980s and 1990s.2 The 
size of the long-term impact of youth unemployment is beyond the 
scope of this report. Future youth unemployment is closely tied to 
overall rates of unemployment,3 which are difficult to forecast. 
Climate change creates a substantial downside risk to the future 
living standards of young people.4 While beyond the scope of this 
report, it is important in a holistic consideration of 
intergenerational fairness. Climate change will have more impact 
on those who are young today, and have longer to live. Attitudes 
to government policies to reduce carbon emissions are strongly 
correlated with age.5  
                                            
2 Borland (2014a) 
3 Ibid.  
4 Garnaut (2008) 
5 The 2014 Lowy Institute Poll found that Australians under 45 years are more 
likely to regard global warming as ‘a serious and pressing problem’ (51 per cent) 
The wealth of generations 
Grattan Institute 2014 10 
The report does not provide a comprehensive account of the 
financial position of different generations over the lifecycle. 
Older Australians are right to point out that they have paid taxes 
over their lifetime and are entitled to support in retirement. This 
generational bargain is longstanding. On current settings, people 
on average contribute to government budgets between the ages 
of 24 and 58, and draw down when younger and older.6 
Yet there are real questions about the quantum of this support, 
how it should be targeted, and whether it will be sustainable in the 
future. There are concerns that the current policy settings will lead 
to younger generations putting considerably more into the system 
than they take out over their lifetimes. Research underway at 
Grattan Institute will look at this “generational accounting” for 
different generations under different policy assumptions.  
The report also does not explicitly address issues of intra-
generational fairness. In considering economic outcomes across 
generations we focus on the average (and median) outcomes for 
different age groups. This conceals considerable variability within 
each age group. Some young people have seen their wealth grow 
rapidly just as some older people struggle to make ends meet.  
Large and increasing differences in income and wealth among 
people of a similar age raise important policy issues.7 It is difficult 
to justify a political system that leads to some people having so 
                                                                                    
compared with those 45 years and older (40 per cent). See: Lowy Institute 
(2014), p. 9. 
6 Rice, et al. (2014) 
7 OECD (2011) 
few resources that they do not have opportunities to pursue lives 
that they have reason to value.8 Many believe there are good 
reasons to try to reduce the gap in outcomes further.9 Yet many 
others oppose government interventions focused primarily on 
reducing the variability in outcomes, either because it mutes the 
incentive for individual effort, or because it implies a much larger 
role for the state. 
The report deals with fairness between different generations. It 
raises different issues to fairness within generations. Fairness 
between generations depends on economic circumstances –
particularly asset price changes and income growth – and 
government policy, particularly age-based tax, welfare and benefit 
policies, and the scale of budget deficits. Unlike the outcomes 
within a generation, individual talent and effort play little role. It is 
difficult to justify making policy decisions that would leave a 
subsequent generation worse off, particularly if that generation 
has little or no say in the decisions. 
Intra-and inter-generational fairness are linked. If a generation 
does relatively badly, the poor of that generation may be 
particularly vulnerable. Indeed, people today who are both young 
and poor are probably the most financially vulnerable group in 
society.10  
                                            
8 Sen (2009), p. 253-254; Daley, et al. (2013), p. 36-37. 
9 OECD (2011), p. 40-41; Daley, et al. (2013), p. 36. 
10 A higher percentage of people over 65 are estimated to live in poverty 
(incomes below 50 per cent of median income) than for younger adults. 
However, the low levels of Newstart and Youth Allowance leave young people 
on income support particularly vulnerable. More than 55 per cent of those 
receiving Newstart and 50 per cent on Youth Allowance sit below the poverty 
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A generation whose income is lower than that of its parents may 
also tend to be a particularly unequal generation. Wealth is likely 
to become more concentrated if a large part of a generation’s 
wealth is inherited rather than earned. Inheritances tend to 
concentrate wealth, as shown both by our study of Australia over 
the last decade, and international experience (see Section 5.2).11  
Many interventions that are likely to reduce inter-generational 
inequality would probably also reduce intra-generational 
inequality. Which provides all the more reason to pursue them. 
 
                                                                                    
line. This compares to 16 per cent on the Age Pension. Lower levels of home 
ownership among today’s young (Chapter 2) compounds their future vulnerability 
as home ownership provides significant protection against poverty for people as 
they get older. See: ACOSS (2014) 
11 In periods when the return on capital is high relative to economic growth 
(which it may well be in decades to come – Chapter 4), inherited wealth 
becomes more important in determining the economic outcomes of future 
generations. See Picketty (2013) 
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2 Growing wealth has not benefited the young  
Over the last decade, older households captured most of the 
growth in Australia's wealth. Despite the global financial crisis, 
households aged between 65 and 74 today are $200,000 
wealthier than households of that age eight years ago. 
Meanwhile, the wealth of households aged 25 to 34 has gone 
backwards. 
In part, the wealth of generations has diverged because of the 
boom in housing prices. Older households made big capital gains. 
With lower and falling rates of home ownership, younger 
households shared less of this windfall.  
Incomes also grew fastest for older Australians, allowing them to 
add more to their wealth through savings. Households aged 55-64 
saved $12,000 in 2010, up from $1000 in 2004. Households aged 
25 to 34 controlled their spending just as tightly, but their savings 
only increased to $11,000 in 2010 from $4000 in 2004, because 
their incomes did not rise as much. 
2.1 Older age groups – but not others – are becoming more 
wealthy  
Most age groups are more wealthy than they were in 2003-04, 
even though almost all age groups lost wealth between 2009-10 
and 2011-12 in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. Yet it 
was older households who captured much of the increase in 
wealth over the decade.  
For example, an average 55 to 64 year old household was 
$173,000 richer in real terms in 2011-12 than was a household of 
that age in 2003-04 (1.9 per cent annual growth). The average 65 
to 74 year old household was $215,000 better off over the same 
period (2.7 per cent annual growth) (Figure 2.1). 
By contrast, younger age groups increased their net assets less. 
The average 35-44 year old household was only $80,000 richer 
over the period than was a household of that age eight years 
earlier (1.7 per cent annual growth). Those aged 25 to 34 on 
average went backwards in real terms.  
These averages may obscure some large differences within age 
groups. Nevertheless, wealth for the median household in each 
age group shows the same trends as for average wealth. The 
wealth of the median household over 55 grew strongly (more than 
2 per cent annual growth), stagnated for households aged 35-44 
(0.3 per cent annual growth) and declined for those aged 25-34 
(minus 2.7 per cent growth) (see Appendix A).12 
Aggregate wealth data based on the national accounts indicates 
that this generational divergence in wealth accumulation, coupled 
with population ageing, means that older generations now hold 
more of the total wealth in Australia. Households aged 65+ held 
26 per cent of total wealth in 2003-04. By 2011-12, they owned 30 
per cent (Figure 2.2).13 
                                            
12 ABS (2013c) 
13 ABS (2014c) 
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Figure 2.1: Those over 45 became much richer, while the wealth of 
younger cohorts stagnated 
Average wealth by age of head of household, 2012$ ‘000s 
 
Note: Estimates for households 15-24 and 75+ have high standard errors and should be 
used with caution. The ABS apportions its household data by age group based on the age 
of the head of the household (‘reference person’). The reference person is chosen by 
applying the following selection criteria, until a single appropriate reference person is 
identified: (1) owner without a mortgage, owner with a mortgage, renter, other housing 
tenure; (2) one of the partners in a registered or de facto marriage, with dependent 
children, one of the partners in a registered or de facto marriage, without dependent 
children, a lone parent with dependent children (3) the person with the highest income, (4) 
the eldest person. See: ABS (Various years-b). The analysis of wealth in this report 
generally follows the ABS Survey of Income and Housing: ABS (2013c). We also analysed 
household wealth as reported in the HILDA survey from 2002 and 2010, which generally 
produced very similar results to those from the ABS survey. As the ABS survey has a 
larger sample size, we have preferred it to the HILDA survey.  
Source: Grattan analysis of ABS (2013c) 
Figure 2.2: Households over 65 captured a growing share of total 
wealth  
Percentage of total wealth  
 
Note: In compiling these estimates, the ABS uses estimates of national wealth from the 
Australian System of National Accounts ABS (2013a) and distributes these across 
households by age group using information from the ABS Survey of Income and Housing 
and ABS Household Expenditure Survey ABS (Various years-b).  
Source: Grattan analysis of ABS (2014c). 
All age groups hold half or more of their assets in property, and 
the rest in superannuation, financial assets such as bank 
accounts and shares, and other wealth, such as house contents, 
vehicles, and business wealth. Liabilities – primarily mortgages – 
are significant for younger households, whereas those over 65 
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have few debts, and typically own their homes outright (Figure 
2.3).14 
Figure 2.3: Over half of household wealth is in property  
Average wealth per household by type, 2012$ ‘000s 
 
Source: Grattan analysis of ABS (2013c) 
                                            
14 This analysis is consistent with RBA analysis of aggregate assets across the 
economy. See: RBA (2014a), p. 6. 
2.2 Home ownership is declining, especially among the 
young  
Home ownership rates have fallen over the last two decades for 
all but the oldest households. While younger age groups have 
always been less likely to own their home, ownership is 
increasingly diverging by age.  
Figure 2.4: Younger people are less and less likely to own homes 
Home ownership rate (per cent) by age group 
 
Source: Yates (2011a); see also Burke et al. (2014) 
Home ownership has declined most amongst 25 to 44 year olds. 
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own home.15 By 2011 only 48 per cent did so. The decline over 
the same period was 10 percentage points for those aged 35 to 
44 (Figure 2.4). An increasing proportion of those born after 1970 
will never get on the property ladder.16 Alongside rising prices, 
increasing education debts may also be discouraging younger 
households from taking out mortgages to purchase a home. 
Figure 2.5: Home ownership declined most for the young and poor  
Percentage point change in home ownership rates, 1981 to 2011 by age 
and income quintile 
 
Source: Burke et al. (2014) based on ABS (Various years-a). 
                                            
15 Either outright or with a mortgage.  
16 Kelly, et al. (2013) 
Among younger households, home ownership rates are declining 
particularly for lower income households, which are likely to be 
those with lower levels of education (Figure 2.5).  
A gap may be emerging between home ownership expectations 
and reality. Despite falling rates of home ownership, around three 
quarters of today’s 15 to 19 year olds consider home ownership 
highly important. Just over 70 per cent consider it ‘extremely 
likely’ or ‘very likely’ that they will one day own a home.17  
2.3 Have the young missed out on the housing boom?  
Because younger households are now less likely to own a home, 
many members of the generation born after 1965 missed out on 
rising housing wealth as house prices boomed from the mid-
1990s. Between 1995 and 2012, real house prices increased by 
4.3 per cent a year, considerably faster than the growth in full-time 
earnings (Figure 2.6).18  
The housing price boom was a result of increasingly available 
credit,19 falling interest rates, and construction of new dwellings 
not keeping up with population growth in large cities.20 Other likely 
causes were growth in household incomes as female workforce 
participation increased (Section 3.1) and policy settings such as 
the introduction of the capital gains tax discount in 1999 and 
                                            
17 Mission Australia’s Survey of 14,000 15-19 year olds. See: Mission Australia 
(2014) 
18 ABS (2013d). Growth rates are calculated based on median house prices.  
19 Greater competition and product innovation associated with deregulation of 
the financial sector resulted in cheaper and more accessible finance during the 
1990s. See: Ellis (2006); Productivity Commission (2004) 
20 Productivity Commission (2004); Yates (2011b); Eslake (2014) 
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generous assistance for first home buyers.21 Because the boom 
coincided with a record period of uninterrupted economic 
growth,22 expectations of future income growth are also likely to 
have played a role in increasing demand.  
The rise in housing prices generated windfall gains for those who 
owned property before 1995. These could be considered 
unearned gains – the result of policy and economic factors rather 
than productive activities or as compensation for taking an 
investment risk.23  
At the same time, younger generations are more likely to have 
purchased their first house or upgraded their house during or after 
the boom. Households that did not own property before the boom 
– disproportionately the younger generation – missed out on the 
windfall boost in wealth from the price rises.24  
                                            
21 Previously capital gains were taxed based on real (inflation adjusted) gains. In 
September 1999, the arrangements were changed so that nominal gains were 
taxed but on a discounted basis (50 per cent discount provided the asset was 
held for more than a year). Strong house price growth and low inflation increased 
the attractiveness of investing in property under the new regime. The 
Productivity Commission argued that these policy changes contributed to the 
housing boom’s ‘second wind’. See: Productivity Commission (2004), p. XIX. 
22 Battellino (2010) 
23 Returns on housing investments would be expected to include some risk 
premium. However, the very strong growth in prices over the past 15 years is a 
significant upside gain. The average return on housing over time is almost 
certainly in excess of the risk adjusted return required to hold such assets.  
24 Some argue that if people still live in their houses then the wealth gains from 
higher house prices are notional rather than real. Ultimately if these households 
choose to pass on their housing wealth rather than consume it, this could 
mitigate concerns about intergenerational inequality (Chapter 6). But during their 
Figure 2.6: Real house prices have outstripped full-time weekly 
earnings since 1998 
Index 1970=100 
 
Note: Earnings are total average weekly (ordinary time) earnings for full time adults 
deflated by the CPI. 
Source: Yates (2011b) 
The fundamentals of the real estate market may keep house 
prices high. Yet the windfall rise in prices is unlikely to be 
repeated. Many observers believe that future prices are unlikely to 
grow as quickly as they did over the last 15 years25 because 
                                                                                    
lifetimes these households still live in better houses than they could afford if they 
had bought after the boom.  
25 Eslake (2014); Fox and Tulip (2014), p. 27.  
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income growth is likely to be slower,26 and official interest rates 
are unlikely to fall much further.  
Recently, low interest rates have moderated the impact of higher 
house prices on household budgets. Yet the expected repayment 
burden – based on a longer term interest rate to account for the 
expectation that variable interest rates will move up over time – is 
at a 10-year average. In NSW and Victoria, where house prices 
have grown most strongly, the expected repayment burden is 
close to a 20-year high.27  
2.4 Older households saved more because their incomes 
rose faster 
The windfall gains from the housing boom for many older 
households were compounded as older groups saved 
substantially more over the last decade.  
Household wealth can increase either because asset values rise, 
or because households save more. Savings are particularly 
important for young households that have few existing assets.  
Overall household savings increased markedly over the decade. 
The savings rate increased from just 0.4 per cent of after-tax 
income in 2003 to 10 per cent in 2013.28  
All age groups saved more of their income, but households aged 
55-64 increased their savings most (Figure 2.7). Even though 
                                            
26 Gruen and Wilcox (2014) 
27 RBA (2014b) 
28 ABS (2013a) 
their spending increased more than any other age group, their 
incomes grew even faster (Figure 2.8). 
Young households also saved more (Figure 2.7). They did so by 
containing spending as their disposable incomes increased 
(Figure 2.8).29  
Figure 2.7: Households’ savings increased between 2004 and 2010 
Savings as a proportion of disposable income (savings rate), per cent 
 
Note: Households’ savings rates are positively skewed. To limit the impact of this skew on 
our analysis, we remove the lowest and highest deciles. Median household savings rates 
are reported in Appendix A. 
Source: ABS Household Expenditure Survey 2003-04 and 2009-10 
                                            
29 ABS (2006); ibid.; ABS (2011b) 
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Figure 2.8: Consumption increased for older households, but their 
incomes rose even faster 
Change in household income and expenditure 2003-04 to 2009-10, 
2010$ 
 
Note: Households’ savings rates are positively skewed. To limit the impact of this skew on 
our analysis, we remove the lowest and highest deciles. 
Source: ABS Household Expenditure Survey 2003-04 and 2009-10 
2.5 Income trends 
These gains in income reflect broader trends. After incomes fell in 
real terms in the late 1970s and 1980s, median incomes before 
tax increased over the last two decades for all age groups except 
the under 25s (Figure 2.9).  
Figure 2.9: All those over 25 had higher incomes in 2011 than 1986 
Median individual wage and welfare income before tax, 2011$ 
 
Note: Incomes are recorded in the Census as the total of wages and salaries, government 
benefits, pensions, allowances and any other income they usually receive, before 
deductions for tax, superannuation contributions, health insurance, amounts salary 
sacrificed, or any other automatic deductions. Because census participants are only asked 
about regular income, it is likely that most investment income (which can be irregular in 
nature) is not captured in the Census data. For this reason, the data are not directly 
comparable to the household income data in Figure 2.10. 
Source: Grattan analysis of ABS Census 1976-2011 
The income drop for under 25s is not necessarily troubling. 
Median incomes for the 15-19 and 20-24 age groups fell as more 
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young people studied full-time or combined part-time work and 
study, and consequently started to work full-time later in life.30  
Nevertheless, the overall outcomes obscure some big differences. 
Over the last two decades women and high-income men have 
earned much more than they used to. On the other hand, men on 
low incomes today earn little more in real terms than did low 
income men 30 years ago (Appendix A).31 
Household incomes have increased even faster. Between 2003-
04 and 2011-12 incomes increased for households of all age 
groups. Wage growth was the major driver. Lower income 
households (bottom four income deciles) also earned more as 
female workforce participation increased.32 Otherwise, changes in 
household composition and family formation have not significantly 
affected household incomes in recent years.33 
Income growth was strongest over the nine years for households 
headed by people aged 55-64 and 65+ (3.9 percent annual 
growth), reflecting increasing participation rates. The incomes of 
households in other age groups grew by less than three per cent 
annually over the period (Figure 2.10).  
                                            
30 Abhayaratna and Lattimore (2006) 
31 Income trends for high income men are analysed by considering the income 
for men at the 80th percentile of the earnings distribution over time. Incomes for 
low income men are assessed at the 20th percentile. Men in this group in the 25-
54 age cohorts have median incomes at least 30 per cent lower in real terms 
than the same group 30 years ago. ABS (Various years-a) 
32 Greenville, et al. (2013); ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
Figure 2.10: Household incomes increased for all age groups 
Household wage, business and welfare income before tax, 2012$ ’000s 
 
Note: These income estimates are based on aggregate estimates of national income from 
the Australian National Accounts. They are more comprehensive estimates of income than 
the census estimates in Figure 1. The distribution of incomes by age of household head is 
determined by the ABS using weights from the suite of ABS publications derived from the 
ABS Survey of Income and Housing and Household Expenditure Survey. 
Source: ABS (2014c). 
2.6 Property and savings have driven wealth accumulation 
As a result of house price increases and invested savings, the 
wealth (net of debt) of all age groups over 45 substantially 
increased over the eight years to 2011-12. Property wealth 
increased most for 65 to 74 year olds – by $110,000 or 2.9 per 
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cent annual growth. For those aged between 55 and 75, higher 
superannuation balances also contributed to higher wealth (Figure 
2.11).  
At the same time, the net wealth of younger Australians 
stagnated. Households headed by those under 35 have less 
wealth in their home than did the same group eight years ago. 
And while today’s 34-55 year olds own houses that are worth 
more, they had to borrow more to acquire them. Borrowing more 
relative to income is one way that younger generations are 
adapting to declining housing affordability.34  
Younger age groups today do own more “other financial assets” – 
including bank deposits and shares – than did their predecessors. 
Compulsory superannuation should further boost their lifetime 
savings.  
                                            
34 Burke, et al. (2014) 
Figure 2.11: Over 35s own property worth more than 8 years ago  
Change in mean wealth per household, 2003-04 to 2011-12, 
2012$ ‘000s 
 
Note: A negative change in liabilities denotes an increase in the amount borrowed per 
household in that age group.  
Source: Grattan analysis of ABS (2014c) 
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3 Spending policies increasingly benefit older Australians  
As well as benefiting from a housing windfall and increased 
incomes, older generations over the last decade also benefited 
disproportionately from Australia’s tax and welfare system.  
Governments are spending much more on pensions and services, 
particularly health, for older households. In 2010, governments 
spent $9400 more on households over 65 than they did six years 
before. Older Australians pay less in taxes than they receive in 
benefits, while other age groups are net contributors to the 
budget. This generational bargain is longstanding,35 but in the 
past two decades the size of the transfer has increased per 
household.  
In the past, each generation took out more from the budget over 
its lifetime than it put in. This part of the generational bargain was 
sustainable when incomes rose quickly, as they did for 70 years. 
However, government transfers from younger to older cohorts are 
now so large that future budgets may not be able to afford them 
as the population ages. Consequently, the generational bargain is 
at risk. 
Furthermore, budget deficits funded much of the increased 
spending over the last decade. Future taxpayers will have to 
repay the debt, dragging further on the prosperity of younger 
generations. 
                                            
35 Barr (2001) argues that in addition to poverty relief, a key function of the 
welfare state is to act as a “piggy bank”, redistributing income over the lifecycle 
for individual citizens.  
3.1 Contribution to the budget by age group  
Almost all age groups are net overall contributors to government 
budgets. In other words, they pay more taxes (income and sales 
taxes) than they receive in government benefits, including both 
welfare and government services. The average household moves 
from being a net contributor to a net drawer on the budget when 
the head of household turns 58.36  
The scale of this transfer to older households is increasing, as 
Figure 3.1 shows.37 Most of the increase happened over the last 
decade. In 2009-10, households 65 and over received $9400 
more in real terms per household in net benefits (cash assistance 
and benefits in kind minus taxes) compared to 2003-04. This 
jump, much larger than for other households, was primarily a 
result of increased spending on health and the Age Pension, and 
relatively small tax increases.  
This increased transfer to households 65 and over was not funded 
at the time through higher contributions from other age groups.  
                                            
36 Rice, et al. (2014), p.12-13 
37 To fully explain changes in spending at the household level, estimates should 
control for changes in household size. Unfortunately the ABS does not equivalise 
the data in this way. In an analysis of trends in government health spending by 
age group, Tapper and Phillimore (2014) consider changes in household size by 
age group over time. They find small declines in the size of young (14-44 year 
old) and middle aged (45-64 year old) households and no change in the size of 
elderly (65+ year old) households. This means that the increases in spending on 
young and middle aged households will be somewhat understated by the 
analysis. But the significant increase in spending for older households cannot be 
explained by changes in household size.  
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Figure 3.1: The generational bargain transfers substantial 
resources from younger to older households  
Average net benefits per household, 2010$ 
 
Note(s): Net benefits are social assistance benefits in cash, plus support in kind, minus 
income and sales taxes. Age is by age of household reference person – households 
headed by someone 35-44 receive higher net benefits than other younger households 
because a greater number have school age children and therefore education spending is 
higher on these households (Figure 2.11).  
Source: Grattan analysis of ABS (2012) (Table 19).  
Most age groups experienced a small increase in their net 
transfers over the same period. Instead, it was funded through 
budget deficits, as governments swung from substantial surpluses 
to substantial deficits. The estimated cost of the increased net 
transfer to 65 and over households was about $22 billion a year. 
The transfer contributed substantially to Commonwealth 
Government deficits, which have exceeded $40 billion a year for 
four of the last five years.38 
3.2 More spending on older Australians  
Australian governments give direct (cash) assistance to support 
those most in need. They also provide most people with a range 
of services in kind, including subsidised access to education, 
health and housing services. Much of this support goes to older 
Australians. Households over 65 also receive more social 
assistance benefits, primarily the Age Pension, and more 
government-funded health services than do other age groups 
(Figure 3.2). 
The cost of these services outweighs the much higher 
government spending on education for other age groups, 
particularly on school education for the children of households 
headed by a person aged between 35 and 54. Meanwhile, 
because many more of them are retired, people in households 
over 65 pay far less tax, particularly income tax, than does any 
other age group. 
                                            
38 Treasury (multiple years) 
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Figure 3.2: Governments spend more on older households due to 
health, the Age Pension and low taxes 
Government spending and taxation per household, 2010$  
 
Notes: Age is by age of household reference person – hence government spending on 
schools is reflected by much more education spending on 35-44 year old households. 
Other in kind includes childcare assistance, other social security and welfare benefits, 
housing benefits and electricity concessions.  
Sources: Grattan analysis of ABS (2012) (Table 19).  
The skew in assistance for older age groups has increased over 
the last 20 years. Increases in government spending on health 
and cash benefits for households over 65 have been larger than 
the increases in government spending for other age groups 
(Figure 3.3). 
Figure 3.3: Health spending and cash benefits for over 65s have 
increased significantly  
Change in government benefits per household (1988-89 to 2009-10), 
2010$ 
 
Notes: Other in kind includes  childcare assistance, other social security and welfare 
benefits, housing benefits and electricity concessions.  
Sources: Grattan analysis of ABS (2012), Table 19.  
3.3 Welfare spending trends by age 
Welfare benefits (cash payments) increased more for households 
over 65 than they did for other age groups (Figure 3.3). 
A household headed by someone over 65 today receives $4400 
more in real terms in welfare benefits each year than did the 
equivalent household 20 years ago. Most of this increase reflects 
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higher Age Pension expenditure. The largest increase ($3100 a 
year, an increase of more than 20 per cent) occurred between 
2003-04 and 2009-10. The underlying policy changes include:39 
x a reduction in the taper rate for the pension asset test in 
2006-07, costing $1 billion a year;40 and 
x an increase of more than 10 per cent in in the base pension 
rate in 2009 at a cost of about $3 billion a year. 41 
A further increase of 1.7 per cent in the base pension rate was 
introduced in 2010-11 to compensate for the introduction of the 
carbon price, but not withdrawn when the carbon price was 
repealed.42  
There have been attempts to contain growth in spending on 
pensions. The Rudd Government increased the Age Pension 
eligibility age from 65 to 67. Yet this will only be phased in 
between 2017 to 2023. Other changes, passed by Parliament in 
2014, include: 
                                            
39 Tapper, et al. (2013) 
40 Under the revised taper rate, pensioners lost only $1.50 per fortnight (rather 
than $3) for every $1000 of assets above the threshold. See: Treasury (2007); 
Treasury (2006) 
41 Includes age, disability and other pension payments. Treasury (2009), Budget 
Paper No. 2. This increase was over and above the legislated increase in the 
base pension rate by the growth in average weekly earnings. The Age Pension 
is indexed twice annually to the greater of the growth in CPI or the Pensioner 
and Beneficiary Living Cost Index (PBLCI). The new payment rates are then 
benchmarked against the MTAWE. If the new payment rate is below the 
benchmark (66.3per cent for couples) payments are increased to this 
benchmark. See: Klapdor (2014b) 
42 Treasury (2011) 
x less favourable treatment of account-based pensions under 
the means test; and  
x ceasing to index the Clean Energy Supplement.43 
The Abbott Government has proposed a number of other changes 
that have not yet been passed by Parliament, including:44 
x lifting the Age Pension qualifying age further, from 67 to 70 by 
2035; 
x indexing the Age Pension and pension equivalent payments to 
CPI rather than to growth in average full time weekly earnings; 
x suspension of the indexation of income and asset test 
thresholds for three years from 2017; and 
x reduction of deemed income thresholds from 2017. 
These measures will save a little in the short term, and much 
more in the long run. As many of them do not take effect until 
2017, the 2014-15 Budget contains little detail about long run 
savings. 45 The Parliamentary Budget Office has estimated that by 
2025 these policy changes will save around $7 billion each year.46  
                                            
43 Social Services Amendment Bill No. 6 (2014) 
44 Klapdor (2014a) 
45 Treasury (2014a) and Treasury (2013b) 
46 PBO (2014) 
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3.4 Health spending trends by age  
Over the past 20 years, government health spending per person 
increased in real terms by about 3.7 per cent a year.47 
Cumulatively, government health spending per person doubled. 
Non-demographic increases in health spending – rather than 
population ageing – have been the main factor putting pressure 
on government budgets over the last decade. They may well 
continue to be more important than population ageing for the next 
generation of budgets.48 
All age groups contributed materially to the rising cost of health 
over this period. Governments spend around $2500 more a year 
on health for each household under 35 compared to two decades 
ago. Households headed by someone over 65 receive more than 
$8500 in additional spending each year (Figure 3.3). 
Health spending per person, rather than per household, follows 
similar patterns. Government health spending per person 
increased across all age groups (Figure 3.4).49 While the growth 
rate in spending was similar across people of all ages, the dollar 
value of spending increased most for older people, because of the 
higher spending base.  
                                            
47 AIHW (2014b) using the period 1993-94 to 2012-13. 
48 Daley, et al. (2014) 
49 Health spending can be analysed more carefully by person, rather than by 
household. This disaggregated approach means we can analyse how much 
changes in health spending are the result of demographic and non-demographic 
factors – which is particularly important in projecting government health 
spending. As far as we know, spending figures using this approach to 
disaggregation have not been published before in Australia (Appendix C).  
Figure 3.4: Government health spending increased the most for the 
over 70s 
Government health spending per person, 2010$ 
 
Notes: Caution is advised with the 80+ estimates, especially in 1999 when the highest age 
category is ‘75 and over’. 
Source: ABS Fiscal Incidence Studies (various years); ABS Cat 3101.0, Table 59; Grattan 
analysis. 
Increased utilisation rather than population ageing has been the 
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percentage points of the 3.7 per cent annual increase in health 
expenditure per person over the 20 years has been from ageing 
(Figure 3.7). In part this is because many baby boomers, who 
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reached these higher spending age groups.50 The other three per 
cent annual increase in health expenditure is non-demographic 
growth: more and better treatments per person being provided to 
people of a given age.  
Each age group’s contribution to the total growth in government 
health spending over the last 20 years is shown in Figure 3.5. The 
cost of older age groups was similar to the cost of younger 
groups, which takes into account that there are fewer people in 
older age groups. However, as the population ages and the 
number of people in these age groups swells, the relative cost of 
those aged 60 and over will rise.  
The increasing demand for health services for younger and 
middle-aged people seems to contradict the claim that so-called 
healthy ageing will postpone age-related increases in health 
expenditure.51 Rather, spending patterns are consistent with the 
proposition that society is prepared to spend proportionately more 
of its income on health services as incomes rise.52 Without 
significant policy changes to contain costs, it seems likely the 
trend towards increased services for all age cohorts will 
continue.53  
                                            
50 Productivity Commission (2005), p. 128. 
51 The OECD suggest that the effects of an ageing population on health 
expenditure might be deferred because of ‘healthy ageing’ – which relies on the 
assumption that the number of years of life lived in bad health remains constant 
in the wake of increased longevity (OECD (2006)). 
52 Gruen and Thomson (2007) 
53 A range of studies have looked at ways to reduce service utilisation through 
preventative health interventions (for example, Vos, et al. (2010)) and through 
reducing use of unnecessary services (for example, Duckett and Breadon 
(forthcoming), NPS MedicineWise (2014)).  
Figure 3.5: All age groups contributed to the growth in government 
health spending 
Increase in real government health spending, 1989 to 2010, $ billion 
 
Note: Less reliance ought to be placed on figures for 80+, as sample sizes are small and 
data categories change across surveys. Spending figures are adjusted to constant prices 
using the GDP implicit price deflator. Since health prices grew somewhat faster than 
average price levels, a small proportion of the increase across all categories will reflect this 
faster price growth.  
Source:  ABS (Various years-b); ABS (2014a)Table 59; Grattan analysis  
Some projections of future government spending assume that the 
historic growth in government spending on health per person of a 
given age will slow (Box 2). Yet even if we do see some 
moderation, increasing per capita spending on older people will 
magnify the spending pressures from population ageing.  
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Even ‘conservative’ forecasts suggest that government health 
spending will be an increasing proportion of GDP. The 
Productivity Commission estimates that State and Commonwealth 
government health spending will increase from 6.5 per cent of 
GDP in 2011-12 to almost 11 per cent of GDP in 2059-60.54 
Spending increases of this magnitude will create a sizeable hole 
in government budgets (see Section 3.6).  
3.5 Taxation trends by age 
Households of all ages pay more tax in real dollar terms than 20 
years ago.  
Income taxes increased most for 55 to 64 year old households, in 
line with the larger increases in income for this group, at least 
over the past decade (Figure 3.6). In general, income tax 
increases broadly reflect the pattern of income growth by age 
(Figure 2.10). The exception is for households over 65, whose 
income tax bill declined, despite strong growth in income over the 
last decade. This may be because concessional superannuation 
tax arrangements now allow individuals over 60 to materially 
reduce their income tax liability, by up to $5000 a year, and the 
Seniors and Pensioners Tax Offset can also reduce tax payable 
by up to $1600.55  
All age groups paid more indirect taxes, including older 
households. This reflects both the increase in indirect taxes with 
the introduction of the GST in 2000, and all age groups 
consuming more as their incomes rose in real terms (Section 2.4).  
                                            
54 Productivity Commission (2013a), p. 136. 
55 AAP (2013); Daley, et al. (2013), p. 33 
Figure 3.6: Taxes increased less for older households because of 
the decrease in income tax  
Change in taxes per household, 1988-89 to 2009-10, 2010$ 
 
Sources: Grattan analysis of ABS (2012), Table 19. 
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Box 2: Forecasts of health expenditure growth 
The Treasury and the Productivity Commission have both forecast 
health expenditure over long time horizons.  
Both forecast that governments will spend more on health in real 
terms over the decades to come as a result of an ageing 
population. However, both assume that increases in health 
spending due to demographic factors will be lower than over the 
last two decades. They expect that increases due to ageing will be 
offset by slower total population growth.  
Both agencies also forecast that non-demographic growth will not 
be as fast as in the last two decades. For example, the 
Intergenerational Report 2010 (IGR) implicitly assumes that annual 
non-demographic growth from 2010 to 2050 will only be 2.6 per 
cent (Figure 3.7). Given the historic experience, this may be 
optimistic. 
On the other hand they may be right to forecast slower growth in 
government health spending. Health spending has grown more 
slowly in almost all OECD countries in recent years (OECD 
(2013)). In Australia, government spending for people of a given 
age fell in 2012-13, the first decline in 20 years (AIHW (2014b)). 
This may have been affected by one-off factors that are unlikely to 
be repeated, such as a number of ‘blockbuster’ drugs on the 
Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme coming off patent and a decline 
in private health insurance rebate payments because many people 
pre-paid their 2012-13 insurance in the previous financial year to 
avoid the new means test. It may also reflect health costs being 
shifted onto patients. Once patient costs are included, health 
expenditure still grew by 1.5 per cent (AIHW (2014a)). 
Figure 3.7: IGR assumes slower non-demographic growth in health 
spending 
Annual growth in real government health spending  
 
Notes: All date ranges are based on financial years. IGR estimates are based on spending by 
the Australian Government only whereas PC and Grattan estimates also include State 
Governments. All projections of health spending are based on trends in costs of health services 
per head of population by age, combined with projected changes in the size and age structure of 
the population. Grattan estimates of demographic growth are separated into ageing and 
population components. The IGR and PC estimates are both based on component modelling – 
forecasting separately the individual components of government health spending. For the IGR, 
component modelling was used for the forecasts up to 2024, taking into account policies that are 
intended to contain costs. From 2024, the IGR assumes that non-demographic spending would 
trend upward to reach 3.2 per cent per annum.  
Source Treasury (2010b); Productivity Commission (2013a); Grattan analysis. 
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3.6 Budget deficits also transfer resources between 
generations  
Budget deficits borrow from the future. They require future 
generations of taxpayers to pay for today’s spending. There are 
fundamental issues of intergenerational fairness if future 
taxpayers are forced to bear the burden of today’s spending that 
they neither have a say in, nor benefit from. 
The Commonwealth Government posted headline deficits of more 
than 2 per cent of GDP in five of the last six years. Cyclical 
deficits may have helped to maintain income during the economic 
downturn. But structural deficits are less defensible. The 
Commonwealth Government had a structural budget deficit of 
more than 2 per cent of GDP for the past five years. As Figure 3.8 
shows, the Commonwealth spent more than its income after 
allowing for fluctuations in prices (particularly the mining boom 
and the terms of trade), and the business cycle (particularly the 
Global Financial Crisis).56 
While deficits are forecast to narrow, the Commonwealth’s budget 
position is not expected to balance within the forward estimates 
period (to 2017-18).57 The current plans for budget repair rely on 
substantial bracket creep and other growth in income tax paid by 
individuals, and this approach is not likely to be economically or 
politically sustainable.58  
 
                                            
56 Daley, et al. (2013), p. 7-8 
57 Treasury (2014b) 
58 Daley and Wood (2014) 
Figure 3.8: The Australian Government budget has been in 
structural deficit for almost a decade 
Per cent of nominal GDP 
 
Notes: Cash balance is equal to receipts minus payments, minus Future Fund income 
(under 0.25 per cent of GDP). Stimulus is allocated to the cyclical; changes in company tax 
from the decade average due to depreciation are allocated to cyclical. The depreciation 
rate is assumed to be 15 per cent. Terms of trade baseline is 2002-03. 
Source: Minifie et al. (2013); Grattan analysis  
 
Over the long-term, significant new policy initiatives, rising health 
expenditure, pressure on welfare budgets, and an inevitable fall in 
the terms of trade could lead to the Commonwealth and State 
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Governments collectively posting deficits of 4.5 per cent of GDP, 
or $65 billion in today’s terms.59 
It is arguable that continued deficits are sustainable if they are so 
small that government debt does not increase as a percentage of 
GDP. The burden of interest payments transferred to future 
generations can also be rationalised if the debt funds productive 
investments that benefit future generations, or if economic growth 
is greater than the real interest rate.  
Yet in practice, relatively little of the increase in spending over the 
last decade paid for investments that benefit future generations. 
Most of the big increases in spending were in health and the Age 
Pension.60 While this spending is valuable, it is difficult to argue 
that it benefits future generations much. The substantial increase 
in infrastructure spending may be more defensible – provided the 
spending was well targeted. There are reasons to doubt this was 
always so.61  
Further, the anticipated slowdown in GDP and income growth 
(Chapter 4) will increase the proportion of future income that 
future generations will need to spend to service these deficits.  
3.7 Is the transfer sustainable?  
The generational bargain transfers income from groups that are 
income-rich but asset-poor to those that are wealthy but can have 
limited incomes. The bargain has been sustainable because real 
                                            
59 Daley, et al. (2014) 
60 Ibid. 
61 Productivity Commission (2013b); Daley (2014) 
per capita incomes have grown consistently and strongly for 70 
years. Younger generations have been able to finance the 
retirement of older generations while also improving their own 
living standards.  
Over the next 25 years the generational bargain may be 
undermined, as a result of: 
x ongoing budget deficits that leave debts for the next generation 
to repay; 
x the growth in net government transfers to older Australians;  
x demographic ageing; and 
x the significant increase in house prices relative to earnings 
discussed in Chapter 2. 
The outcome depends greatly on future per capita economic 
growth, discussed in the next Chapter.  
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4 Economic growth cannot be relied on to save the day 
Strong per capita economic growth almost inevitably makes one 
generation better off financially than its predecessor. In the past 
30 years, average annual growth in real GDP per person of 1.9 
per cent and growing resource prices boosted the average real 
disposable income of Australians from $29,000 in 1983-84 to 
$53,000 in 2013-14.62 But continued high levels of growth are not 
guaranteed. Australia faces considerable economic headwinds, 
including lower labour force participation, declining terms of trade 
and perhaps less scope for technologically driven productivity 
improvements. To rely only on economic growth to address future 
budget pressures is to transfer the entire risk of lower growth to 
today’s young.  
4.1 Economic growth and the generational bargain 
Strong per capita economic growth makes a big difference to the 
generational bargain. Incomes have almost doubled over the past 
30 years, the cumulative effect of real per capita incomes growing 
at 1.9 per cent a year.63 When a child’s annual income (and 
therefore in many cases their expenditure) is twice that of their 
parents, it is difficult to have a lower standard of living, no matter 
what happens to asset values. 
Australian per capita GDP has grown consistently for the last 70 
years (Figure 4.1), after accounting for inflation. The fall in 
average incomes between 1976 and 1991 was offset by rapid 
                                            
62 ABS (2014d) 
63 This is the approximate time period between generations. In 1985, the median 
age for first time mothers was 27.3. In 2013 it was 29.3. See: ABS (2014b) 
increases in workforce participation and favourable demographics 
as the weight of the population moved into age groups with higher 
earnings. The subsequent income gains across a broad spread of 
age groups and genders (apart from men on lower incomes)64 
helped to sustain the generational bargain. 
Figure 4.1: Historically there have been generation-long periods of 
stagnant incomes 
Real GDP per capita, 2010$ 
 
Source: Butlin et al. (2014) 
                                            
64 See above Chapter 2, and Appendix B 
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4.2 Strong growth is not inevitable  
In the past, Australia has had extended periods of slow or no 
growth (Figure 4.1). Per capita incomes peaked in 1855, and did 
not regain these levels until 1880. Incomes peaked again in 1890 
at the end of the gold rush, and did not regain this level for 
another 45 years until after the Great Depression.65  
Thus while the growth of the last 70 years has set expectations, it 
may have been an anomaly when seen as part of a longer history. 
Many decades of strongly growing prosperity do not guarantee 
more of the same into the future. The current economic stagnation 
across much of Europe and the United States shows how income 
growth can languish for a decade or more. 
4.3 Drag from declining terms of trade and falling 
participation  
Over the next decade, the rate of improvement in Australia’s living 
standards is expected to fall.66  
Growth in the volume of goods and services produced per person 
in an economy depends on productivity (average output per hour 
worked) and participation (the proportion of the population of 
working age and the average hours worked per person in this 
group).67 Growth in national income also depends on the terms of 
trade (the price of our exports relative to the price of imports – 
                                            
65 McLean (2012), p. 164.  
66 Treasury (2010a), p. vii. 
67 Treasury (2010b), p. 3. 
roughly speaking, the number of televisions that can be bought for 
a tonne of iron ore).  
In the 2000s, record terms of trade led to incomes rising quickly.68 
Labour productivity growth was somewhat lower than in the 
1990s. Productivity growth resulted from a combination of slowly 
increasing productivity in a number of sectors, reduced 
productivity in mining and utilities, and a shift of employment to 
the (highly productive) mining industry.69  
The terms of trade are expected to drag on future income growth. 
Minerals prices are likely to fall as the mining industry shifts from 
an investment phase to a production phase (Figure 4.2).70 The 
drag on per capita incomes will be material – over the next 
decade the annual decline could be about 0.5 percentage points, 
until the terms of trade return to long-run levels. 
Labour force participation may also drag on growth over the next 
few decades as the baby boomer generation reaches retirement 
age. Treasury estimates that the labour force participation rate for 
people aged 15 years and over will fall from 65 per cent in 2010 to 
                                            
68 Carmody (2013) 
69 Borland (2014b) estimates that 1.1 percentage points of the 1.3 per cent per 
annum growth in labour productivity over the decade was due to changes in 
industry composition, principally an increase in the share of hours worked in the 
mining industry. The mining industry generates output worth an average of $317 
per hour worked, significantly higher than the output per hour in any other 
industry. However, productivity in the mining and utilities sectors fell, offsetting 
small rises in productivity in many other sectors. See: Eslake and Walsh (2011) 
70 Stevens (2013); Minifie, et al. (2013) 
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less than 61 per cent by 2049-50, as a smaller proportion of the 
population will be of traditional working age.71  
As a result, participation will change from adding to per capita 
income growth to dragging on growth. After a decade of 
increases, workforce participation fell in Australia over the last two 
years, partly because the impact of ageing overwhelmed the 
increasing participation of older age groups.72 Over the next 20 
years, the annual impact could be a reduction in growth in the 
order of 0.1 to 0.2 percentage points.73 
Immigration will not be enough to offset the effects of 
demographic change on growth. Migration tends to boost 
participation rates, since migrants are somewhat younger on 
average than the resident population. However, assuming net 
migration returns to its 40-year trend, it will moderate but not 
reverse the fall in the participation rate.74  
Of course, an increasing participation rate among older age 
groups may substantially offset the impact of demographic 
change. Policy reforms along the lines of those identified in 
Grattan Institute’s 2012 report, Game-changers, could lead to 
overall increases in participation rates.75  
                                            
71 Treasury (2010b), p. ix. 
72 Daley, et al. (2013), p. 54. There was also a cyclical component to the recent 
decline in labour force participation as discouraged job seekers exited the labour 
force, the so called ‘discouraged worker effect’. See: Christopher Kent (2014).  
73 Unpublished analysis provided by Jeff Borland, University of Melbourne 
74 Treasury (2010b), p. 7-12. 
75 Daley, et al. (2013), p. 61. 
Figure 4.2: Terms of trade added to income growth in the 2000s, but 
will drag in the next decade 
Average percentage growth per year in gross national income per 
person 
 
Note: Assumes labour productivity for 2013-2025 is similar to that for the last 13 years 
Source: Treasury (2014b), Budget Paper No. 1 
4.4 Risks to growth from lower productivity  
Although the terms of trade and participation rates matter, labour 
productivity growth will continue to drive living standards in 
Australia over the decades to come. To maintain historical growth 
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In the medium term, slower growth of the mining industry poses a 
significant threat to Australia’s productivity growth. A decline in the 
share of employment in mining will put downward pressure on 
overall labour productivity because other industries generate 
much less value per hour worked.76 On the other hand, 
productivity within the mining industry will probably rise as the 
industry shifts from an investment to a production phase, 
providing a ‘productivity dividend’ on past investment.77 
Over the longer-term, technological change is the main cause of 
labour productivity improvements. But some economists warn that 
the potential for reduced economic growth over the next few 
decades means there may be less scope for dramatic technology-
driven improvements in living standards similar to those in the 
past. 
United States economist Robert Gordon attributes the growth in 
the US economy over the last 300 years to three waves of 
innovation, or “industrial revolutions”. The first was steam 
engines, cotton spinning and rail roads (1750 to 1830); the 
second electricity, the internal combustion engine and indoor 
plumbing (1870 to 1900); and the third computers, mobile phones 
and the internet (1960 to late 1990s).78 It took about 100 years for 
the full benefits of the first two waves to be felt throughout the 
economy. By contrast, the follow up improvements from the third 
                                            
76 Borland (2014b)  
77 Productivity Commission (2014), p. 12. 
78 Gordon (2012) 
wave percolated more quickly and the growth effects appear 
short-lived.79  
Gordon suggests that while ongoing innovation will continue to 
drive improvements in the standard of living, it will be slower. The 
more transformative changes in these past revolutions, such as 
speed of travel and urbanisation, were one-off. He argues that it is 
difficult to foresee an overarching improvement to technology that 
could drive an equivalent surge in productivity growth.  
Similarly, Tyler Cowen argues that the American economy has 
reached a “technological plateau” and that the other low-hanging 
fruit that would promote growth – better educating the brightest, 
and cultivating unused land – have already been exploited.80  
Others have a different view. Management professors Erik 
Bryanjolfsson and Andrew McAfee argue that we are entering a 
“Second Machine Age” in which digital technologies and intelligent 
machines will deliver greater innovation and growth.81  
Yet falling long-run economic growth rates in developed countries 
provide some support for the ‘techno-pessimist’ view. On one 
analysis, long-term labour productivity in G7 countries grew at 
less than 1 per cent over the last decade, despite the widespread 
diffusion of digital technology during this period.82 The results 
suggest a persistent decline in both productivity and growth over a 
                                            
79 Ibid., p. 1. 
80 Cowen (2011) 
81 Bryanjolfsson and McAfee (2014) 
82 Antolin-Diaz, et al. (2014) 
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number of decades rather than a downward shock from recent 
economic turbulence.83  
Even if the pessimism is only partially justified, given the other 
headwinds, economic growth is likely to be much slower for all 
developed economies, including Australia, over the next few 
decades.84  
These changes emphasise the importance of policy reform to 
encourage economic growth. Reform will be increasingly 
important to raise living standards in a low growth environment.85 
Yet Australian governments have relatively few opportunities for 
game-changing economic reform. All three of the major reforms 
identified in our Game-Changers report would still only increase 
growth in GDP by around 5 percentage points, or 0.5 percentage 
points a year, over a decade.86 And these reforms would be very 
difficult to achieve. Major reform is always hard, both to formulate 
and to implement. The current political climate – particularly the 
24-hour news cycle, the lack of crisis to motivate change, and the 
lack of funds to buy reform – increases the difficulty. 87  
Thus substantially lower per capita income growth in the decades 
to come is a material possibility, given predictable drags from 
                                            
83Ibid. 
84 Economic growth projections based on long run productivity trends already 
factor in the baseline impacts of technological improvements in productivity over 
the past 30 years. So similar improvements in productivity-enhancing innovation 
would be required just to achieve these baseline projections.  
85 For example, Ross Garnaut has warned that Australian living standards are 
likely to stagnate unless governments are prepared to tackle productivity 
enhancing economic reforms See: Garnaut (2013) 
86 Daley, et al. (2012), p. 13. For a summary of other reforms, see Banks (2012) 
87 Daley, et al. (2012), p. 4. 
lower terms of trade and from demographics, and the real risk of 
sluggish long-term productivity growth.  
4.5 Who bears the risk of lower growth?  
Lower growth substantially reduces the improvement in living 
standards from one generation to the next. It also makes capital 
gains more important. If wages have not grown much, then capital 
gains (particularly from a one-off increase in house prices) may 
result in an older generation having more wealth than its 
children.88 
This increases both the size and importance of bequests and 
gifts, as discussed in the next chapter. 
                                            
88 Of course all those with limited wealth (not just the young) suffer greater 
disadvantage from slow economic growth. See: Picketty (2013); Cowen (2013) 
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5 Wealth begets wealth: consumption and inheritance 
Wealth is a store of spending power. Income not consumed can 
be stored as assets, such as bank accounts, shares, dwellings, 
plant and equipment, that generate additional future income. 
Assets can also be converted into cash to finance immediate 
consumption.  
Viewed as a store of potential future spending, wealth is an 
important determinant of future living standards.89 That is why this 
report focusses on wealth as well as income in considering the 
changing economic position of today’s young. 
But wealth is not always used to finance consumption by the 
person who accumulated it. Wealth may be passed from one 
generation to the next through bequests and gifts. If older 
Australians pass on their wealth to their children then living 
standards may be higher for today’s young (and lower for today’s 
older Australians) than the existing distribution of wealth would 
suggest.  
Transfers of wealth across generations through gifts and 
inheritances could mitigate concerns about intergenerational 
inequality. This assumes that: 
x older cohorts will save their additional wealth, rather than 
consuming it; and 
x younger generations will inherit wealth at a time in their lives 
that it will be useful. 
                                            
89 Treasury (2004) 
On current trends, older cohorts are likely to save more than they 
consume. It remains to be seen whether this trend will continue 
when people live for much longer. 
In practice, inheritances tend to transmit wealth to children who 
are already well-off. This has been the pattern internationally for a 
long time. It is also the pattern over the last decade in Australia 
(where data on inheritance is relatively scarce). If the patterns 
continue, then on average the younger generation will ultimately 
have more resources than its parents, but the wealth will be much 
less equally shared. 
It is also likely that the vast bulk of wealth will be inherited by 
people when they are over 55. Life expectancy at birth in Australia 
is now over 80.90 If bequests are primarily made to children, most 
people will be over 50 when they inherit. Although the younger 
generation may ultimately have more wealth in aggregate, its 
members may live much more of their life with lower resources. 
5.1 A lot of wealth will be saved, not spent  
On current trends, the wealth of older households will be saved 
and passed on rather than spent. Analysis from Australia and 
abroad suggests that older households generally maintain (and 
even increase) their wealth in retirement.91  
                                            
90 ABS (2014e) 
91 Börsch-Supan (1992); Alessie, et al. (1999); Feinstein and Ho (2000); Cho and 
Sane (2013) 
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Between 2003-04 and 2009-10 households headed by people 
65+ added to their wealth through savings and appreciation in the 
value of their assets (Figure 1.1). Of course these trends may 
change as more baby boomers reach their twilight years. There is 
some indication that the sense of obligation to the next generation 
is diminishing.92 Increases in life expectancy could also reduce 
the amount the boomers have left to pass on. But there is not yet 
any hard evidence of retirees ‘spending the kids’ inheritance’. 
If current trends continue, then future inheritances may be large. 
For example, if the wealth of all people aged between 75 and 84 
were distributed equally to their children, the mean inheritance per 
child would be $280,000. The median would be much lower – at 
$141,000 – reflecting how a small number of households have a 
disproportionate share of wealth (Figure 5.1).  
Large inheritances and bequests have not been common in 
Australia to date. Of the estimated 13 per cent of people receiving 
an inheritance between 2002 and 2012, more than three quarters 
received less than $100,000 and most less than $50,000.93 Yet, 
the strong growth in the wealth of today’s older generations 
(Chapter 2), combined with the steady shrinking of the family size 
from 1960 to 2000,94 may lead to more and larger inheritances in 
the future.  
                                            
92 Lawrence and Goodnow (2011) 
93 Grattan analysis of HILDA (2002 to 2012). 
94 Australia’s total fertility rate decreased from 3.6 babies per woman in 1960 to 
1.9 babies per woman in 2011. See: ABS (2013b) 
Figure 5.1: High wealth per child for older age groups suggests 
inheritances may be sizeable  
Inheritance per child if current wealth distributed today, 2010$ ‘000s 
 
Notes: Estimates are of the value of potential inheritance from parents in each age group 
assuming that the total value of current wealth is transferred between all children.  
Source: Grattan analysis of HILDA (2010) 
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5.2 Inheritance concentrates wealth among those that are 
older and richer 
Inheritance could reduce intergenerational inequality by 
transferring accumulated wealth to younger generations.95 
However, inheritances tend to go to those that are older than 
average and already wealthy.  
Figure 5.2: People in their 50s and 60s receive larger inheritances  
 
Source:  Grattan analysis of HILDA (2002); (2012) 
                                            
95 In particular, in cases where older Australians pass on more in inheritance to 
their children than they received themselves then this would mitigate against the 
possibility of their children being worse off over their lifetime.  
People aged between 48 and 70 have the highest chance of 
receiving an inheritance of any age group. This group also 
receives larger inheritances than other age groups (Figure 5.2). 
Inheritances are not evenly distributed. People who are already 
wealthy are more likely to receive an inheritance than are less 
wealthy people of a similar age (Figure 5.3).96 
Thus older people are more likely to inherit, and any inheritance is 
more likely to be large. For people of a given age, the wealthy are 
more likely to inherit more. And as Figure 5.3 shows, older people 
are also more likely to be wealthy already. Combining these 
trends, the wealthiest 20 per cent of Australians are four times 
more likely to receive a sizeable inheritance than is the median 
Australian, and 37 times more likely to receive a sizeable 
inheritance than are those in the bottom 20 per cent of the wealth 
distribution (Figure 5.4). 
If inheritances primarily transfer capital to older wealthy people, 
they will not address concerns about intergenerational inequality 
for most of the population. For those most likely to be in need – 
younger people with relatively low incomes – inheritance will not 
do much to reduce the additional taxation burden (or lower levels 
of government support) that may result from unsustainable 
transfers between age groups and increasing deficits. An 
increasing volume of inheritances raises other issues. Sizeable 
inheritances can perpetuate inequality. They reinforce the 
tendency for children of the wealthy to have more and better 
                                            
96 This is similar to the US where the wealthiest 5 per cent of people are more 
than three times as likely to receive an inheritance than the poorest 50 per cent. 
However, the average age of receiving an inheritance is considerably lower in 
the United States (40) than Australia. See: Yellen (2014). 
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schooling, for example.97 And if inheritances rather than lifetime 
earnings are the dominant route to wealth, there is less incentive 
for talented Australians to get ahead through individual endeavour 
– what Thomas Piketty described as the “Jane Austen world”.98  
Figure 5.3: Wealthy people of a given age are more likely to receive 
larger inheritances  
Size of inheritance for those who did receive a bequest between 2002 
and 2012, by age and wealth percentile 
 
Note: Wealth quintiles are based on relative wealth in 2002 and therefore do not include 
the effect of inheritances received after this time.  
Source:Grattan Analysis of HILDA (2002); (2012) 
                                            
97 Bowles, S. and Gintis, H. (2002), The Inheritance of Inequality, Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 16 (3) 3-30.  
98 Picketty (2013) 
Figure 5.4: Inheritances greater than $100,000 tend to go to the 
already wealthy 
Percentage of all individuals receiving an inheritance of more than 
$100,000 between 2002 and 2012 (by wealth quintile) 
 
Note: Wealth quintiles are based on relative wealth in 2002 and therefore do not include 
the effect of inheritances received after this time.  
Source: Grattan Analysis of HILDA (2002); (2012) 
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5.3 Gifts to younger generations tend to be small  
Of course inheritances are not the only way that wealth is 
transferred across generations. Parents might help their children 
save for a house deposit or contribute to their university fees. 
Unlike inheritances, financial gifts are more likely to be received 
by younger cohorts (Figure 5.5).  
Figure 5.5: Young people are most likely to receive a financial gift 
from their parents  
Percentage receiving a gift, 2002 to 2012  
 
Notes: People over 70 are not included because there are too few instances of gifts.  
Source: Grattan Analysis of HILDA (2002); (2012) 
Yet gifts also tend to be relatively modest (most are $5000 or 
less) and therefore are unlikely to alter the substantial patterns of 
intergenerational transfers outlined in this report (Figure 5.6).  
As with inheritances, gifts are larger for those who already have 
relatively more wealth. 
Figure 5.6: The median value of gifts received was small 
Size of gift for those who received one between 2002 and 2012, by age 
and wealth percentile 
 
Notes: People over 70 are not included because there are too few instances of gifts for this 
group. Wealth quintiles are based on relative wealth in 2002 and therefore do not include 
the effect of gifts received after this time.  
Source: Grattan Analysis of HILDA (2002); (2012) 
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6 International experience highlights the risk of lower growth
In both the US and the UK, there are already signs of a fall in the 
fortunes of younger generations, so that the current generation of 
young adults may have less wealth, income and spending than 
their parents. As in Australia, shifts in government spending and 
windfall gains in asset prices that favoured older cohorts are part 
of the story. But the impact of the Great Recession also 
disproportionately affected the young. The experience in these 
countries demonstrates how lower growth, whether cyclical or 
secular, can depress earnings for an extended period. For those 
in their formative years in the workforce, the result is a significant 
hit to lifetime earnings.  
6.1 Stagnant income growth and declining home 
ownership: the UK experience 
In the UK, relatively strong income growth after World War Two 
enabled each generation to earn more than its predecessors at 
the same age. Yet this expectation of ever-rising living standards 
ended with stagnant income growth in the 2000s. Median income 
grew in real terms by less than 0.1 per cent a year over the 10 
years between 2001-02 and 2011, compared to an average of 1.5 
per cent a year over the previous 25 years.99  
As a result, for the last five years most birth cohorts have had 
lower incomes than previous birth cohorts at the same age 
(Figure 6.1). For example, on reaching 40 today, households born 
                                            
99 Hood and Joyce (2013), p. 7. 
in the 1970s have lower median incomes than have those born in 
the 1960s when they turned 40.  
Figure 6.1: Younger cohorts have lower incomes than their 
predecessors at the same age 
Real equivalised median annual household income by age and birth 
year, 2012£ 
 
Notes: Cohorts refer to birth cohorts. So for example, the 1970s cohort includes all people 
born in the 1970s. Calculated using the UK Family Expenditure Survey, various years. 
Based on equivalised median household income, adjusted for change in household size 
and composition. Incomes are measured before deducting housing costs.  
Source: Hood, A and Joyce, R (2013), p. 8. 
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Those who fared worst after the Great Recession of 2008 to 
2009100 were young adults in their formative years in the 
workforce. In 2013, 25 year olds in employment were paid less 
than people at the same age both five and ten years earlier 
(Figure 6.2). The younger generation were also more likely to be 
unemployed than their predecessors at the same age.101  
The total income of young households suffered as a result. In the 
five years to 2012-13, the median household income of 22-30 
year olds fell by 13 per cent. But it only fell by 7 per cent for 
workers aged 31 to 59.102 Earnings fell among the younger 
cohorts even though they are much more educated: 31 per cent of 
25 year olds in 2008-12 had a degree, compared to only 16 per 
cent of 25 year olds 15 years earlier.103  
At a minimum, the extended period of low incomes will put a dent 
in the lifetime earnings of younger cohorts. This will be magnified 
if younger cohorts are not able to catch up to the income levels of 
their predecessors as the economy improves.  
 
 
                                            
100 The UK experienced six consecutive quarters of negative growth across 2008 
and 2009 (Allen (2010)). Growth stagnated in the intervening period and GDP 
did not return to its 2008 peak until the second quarter of 2014. See: Taylor and 
Wales (2014) 
101 Belfield, et al. (2014) 
102 Ibid., p. 90. 
103 Ibid., p. 105. 
Figure 6.2: Despite higher education levels, younger cohorts have 
lower wages at a given age 
Gross annual wages of individuals, by age and birth year, 2013£ 
 
Source: Belfield et al. (2014), p. 105. 
What is more, Britons born in the 1970s and 1980s are less likely 
to own their home than those born in the 1950s and 1960s were 
at the same age. There is no evidence of younger cohorts 
catching up on home ownership (Figure 6.3). On current trends, 
home ownership rates of those born in the mid-1980s may be less 
than half of those born in the late 1950s.  
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Figure 6.3: Younger cohorts in the UK are much less likely to own 
their homes  
Percentage of individuals who own their own home by age  
 
Source: Belfield et al. (2014), p. 52. 
Even if younger cohorts do close the ownership gap, their real 
wealth may be significantly behind that of older people. In the past 
15 years house prices have more than doubled.104 To the extent 
that these were one-off or windfall gains, they accrued to those 
who held housing stock during this period, substantially more of 
whom are in older cohorts.  
                                            
104 Hood and Joyce (2013), p. 44. 
It is also forecast that younger Britons will be net losers from the 
tax and transfer system. Generational Accounting estimates each 
generation’s net contribution to the government budget over its 
lifetime assuming that current policies remain in place. It assumes 
that taxes and expenditures beyond the projection years rise in 
line with trend growth of real income per capita. Estimates 
suggest that a 65 year old UK citizen will take out £220,000 more 
from the budget than he or she puts in. If the government is to 
meet its budget constraint over the long run, younger generations 
will have to pay a net contribution. It is estimated that a 25 year 
old today will contribute £120,000 more in taxes to the Exchequer 
than they take out in benefits (cash payments and benefits in kind 
such as health and education).105  
These trends may partially reflect the fact that younger Britons are 
a less important voting bloc than are their older counterparts. In 
2010, 52 per cent of 18 to 24 year olds voted in the general 
election compared to 75 per cent of those 62 or older.106  
It is quite possible, therefore that Britons born in the 1980s will be 
worse off in material terms than were their parents born in the 
                                            
105 McCarthy, et al. (2011), p. 15. Generational Accounting is a widely used tool 
for analysing fiscal policies. But it is not without criticism. One is that it excludes 
the benefits derived from government spending so if the benefits from some 
current spending (eg, infrastructure spending) accrue later, then the estimates 
do not accurately reflect each generation’s treatment under current policies.  
Another is the sensitivity of the estimates to particular assumptions, particularly 
around the discount rate. See: Williamson and Rhodes (2011). However, 
estimates of the tax adjustments needed to close intergenerational fiscal gaps 
are less sensitive to the discount rate. In the UK, estimates suggest that taxes 
would need to rise by 16.3 per cent to restore the intergenerational budget 
balance. See: McCarthy, et al. (2011).  
106 Dar (2013) 
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1950s. Whether they will be able to catch up on ground lost during 
the Great Recession is unclear. Despite being more educated, 
they may have lower incomes and pay more in taxes from the age 
of 25. They will almost certainly benefit less from rising house 
prices than did their parents.107 
6.2 Declines in income, wealth and increasing debt burden: 
intergenerational transfers in the US  
In the US, income growth has been stagnant for more than a 
decade.108 The incomes of younger people fell in this period, both 
in absolute terms and relative to older workers. Figure 6.4 
highlights the fall in median income for those aged 25 to 34.  
Younger workers now typically earn less than those aged 55 to 
64. The cumulative effect of these trends is that today’s 25 to 34 
year olds earn about as much as 25 to 34 year olds in 1965. By 
contrast, 55 to 64 year olds today earn about 40 per cent more 
than did 55 to 64 year olds in 1965. 
                                            
107 A PWC report compares income and wealth for two otherwise similar 
individuals born in 1963 (baby boom generation) and 1993 (baby bust 
generation). Based on the assumption that income growth will continue at its 30 
year average, it finds that the baby buster will be better off in absolute terms (ie, 
will have higher lifetime wealth and spending). However, their spending and 
wealth will be lower than the rest of the society (which some studies suggest is 
more important than absolute wealth in determining happiness). However, even 
in absolute terms, the non-housing wealth of the baby buster will not surpass 
that of the older generation until aged 62 because of higher student debt and the 
assumption of lower returns to equities and savings. See: PWC (2011)  
108 Both median and mean household incomes have declined somewhat over the 
past ten years. Median household incomes have been stagnant over an even 
longer (15 year) period as income inequality became more pronounced. See: 
United States Census Bureau (2014); Economic Policy Institute (2014) 
Figure 6.4: Incomes of people aged 24 to 34 have declined relative 
to older workers 
Median income by age group, 2011US$  
 
Source: US Department of Commerce (2013) (Table 8).  
Younger age groups also accumulated much less wealth than did 
older groups. While the wealth of those aged between 20 and 46 
remained about the same over the last two decades, the real 
wealth of older cohorts rose quickly (Figure 6.5).  
Significant government debt and unfunded liabilities make 
younger cohorts even more vulnerable. Generational Accounting 
estimates suggest all American generations born before about 
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1980 will receive a net benefit from the government109 – they will 
pay less in taxes than they receive in benefits. Yet those born 
after 1980, currently aged between 20 and 35, will be net 
contributors to government budgets over their lifetimes.  
The accumulated debt and ongoing deficits in the US will take a 
long time to reduce and repay. Without policy changes, younger 
generations will inherit significant debts. To eliminate the ‘fiscal 
gap’ – the present value difference between the government’s 
future receipts and future expenditures, including servicing its 
outstanding official debt – it is estimated that they would need to 
pay taxes over their lifetime of about 60 cents in every dollar 
earned.110 
These growing government transfers from younger to older 
Americans mirror the electoral incentives of politicians. Younger 
Americans are much less likely to vote than are those in other age 
groups. In the 2012 presidential elections, voter turnout was 38 
per cent amongst 18 to 24 year olds but almost 70 per cent for 
those 65 and older.111  
 
                                            
109 This assumes no changes in the policy settings for those currently alive, and 
calculates what future generations will need to pay in taxes net of transfer 
payments assuming that they are left on their own to close the fiscal gap.  
110 Kotlikoff (2013), p. 1 5. 
111 File (2014), p. 2. 
Figure 6.5: Older households became wealthier over the last two 
decades  
Average net household wealth by age group, 2011US$ ‘000s 
 
Notes: Data from Survey of Consumer Finances, various years.  
Sources: Steuerle et al. (2013)  
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7 What governments should do 
Despite growing incomes in Australia over the last two decades, 
the wealth of younger Australians has stagnated. Younger 
generations are less likely to own property than were their parents 
at the same age. The strong growth in prices of the last two 
decades will make it difficult to catch up on home ownership.  
At the same time, government transfers to older Australians are 
growing. If current policy settings for access to superannuation tax 
concessions and the Age Pension are maintained, and if non-
demographic health spending continues to grow at historical 
rates, future budgets will be under significant pressure.  
To date, these pressures have been financed through budget 
deficits rather than by increasing taxes or reducing benefits for 
other age groups. As the population ages, budget pressures 
caused by large and increasing transfers to older age groups will 
intensify.112  
The sizeable forecast deficits and growing debt will require 
governments to either tax younger cohorts more, or to reduce the 
benefits and services they provide.113 
The pressures are exacerbated because economic growth may 
do less than in the past to assist the incomes of younger cohorts 
                                            
112 Daley, et al. (2014) 
113 Previous accumulated government debt, particularly in Victoria and the 
Commonwealth, was largely repaid through asset sales. The remaining sellable 
assets are much smaller, and arguably less ‘sellable’, and so accumulated debts 
will now have to be repaid largely through recurrent surpluses. See Daley, et al. 
(2013), p. 78-79. 
and governments. An ageing population and falling terms of trade 
will drag on growth. Some also predict much slower growth in 
productivity.  
These pressures will only worsen the already lacklustre economic 
position of the younger cohorts, and today’s young adults know it. 
Less than a third of those responding to a survey considered that 
their lives would be better than those of their parents.114  
Another group is vulnerable. Less wealthy older Australians may 
be particularly affected if governments are ultimately forced to cut 
spending, as is already foreshadowed with proposals to limit the 
growth in the rate of the full Age Pension. Generally, retirees on 
the full Age Pension who do not own their home have relatively 
few resources. It is likely that large savings could be made if 
owner-occupied housing were included in the means test for the 
Age Pension, along with a government sponsored home equity 
release scheme for those who are asset rich but cash poor.115 
This reform would most affect those hoping to inherit. If it allowed 
the rate of the Age Pension to continue to increase, the biggest 
winners would be the most vulnerable retirees.  
Will these trends lead to a generation worse off than its parents? 
They certainly won’t help, but the outcome depends on future 
economic growth, the size of budget deficits, and how much 
                                            
114 Only thirty percent of young Australians (29 or younger) responding to an 
IPSOS MORI poll considered that they would have a better life than their 
parents. See: Ipsos MORI (2014)  
115 As proposed, for example in Daley, et al. (2013) 
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governments transfer between generations through taxes, welfare 
and spending on services. 
Our next report will estimate how these policies, ongoing deficits 
and the growing debts of Australian governments will affect 
different generations under various economic growth scenarios. It 
will try to understand how different generations and budget 
outcomes would be affected by policies that more tightly target 
Age Pension, asset taxation (particularly for land), and 
superannuation tax concessions. Previous Grattan work has 
identified these as some of the most attractive opportunities for 
budget repair.116  
Research underway will also consider the total contribution of 
each generation. The generational bargain has traditionally 
allowed each generation to take more from government than it 
contributed in taxes. With rapidly growing incomes, this was 
sustainable. Yet with slower economic growth and significant 
intergenerational wealth transfers through housing, both the UK 
and the US expect to have generations that will contribute more to 
government in taxes than they will ever receive in services. 
Whether Australia follows the same path will depend on both 
economic growth and government policy. 
If government expenditures on health, pensions and 
superannuation concessions are ultimately cut because budgets 
cannot sustain them, then younger Australians will be even more 
disadvantaged. Younger generations, on the wrong side of the 
drawbridge after the policies change, lose because they pay for 
these benefits for others but do not receive them themselves.  
                                            
116 Ibid. 
This strengthens the case for reform sooner rather than later. 
Yet immediate reform will be hard. Older Australian are a 
significant voting bloc. In the 2013 federal election, almost half of 
people enrolled to vote were 50 and over.117 This group’s voting 
share was probably above 50 per cent because of lower voting 
rates by young adults.118 Voters at or near retirement are likely to 
strongly resist policies that reduce superannuation and pension 
entitlements. But many undoubtedly care about the welfare of the 
next generation. Older voters may be persuaded that change is 
necessary if the dividend for younger Australians is clear. 
The generational bargain has served Australia well. Yet it will be 
undermined if some generations are asked to do more than their 
fair share. We hope this report, and subsequent analysis, can 
contribute to ensuring the sustainability and fairness of the tax 
and transfer system, so that our children and grandchildren can 
enjoy the fruits of Australia’s prosperity as much as their parents 
have.  
                                            
117 Just over 47 per cent of voters were 50 and over at the Close of Rolls on 12 
August 2013. See: AEC (2013) 
118 Tiffen (2013) 
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Appendix A: Changes in median wealth and saving by age group
Chapter 2 presents data on average wealth and savings rates by 
age groups. Because of the significant variation in wealth and 
savings within age groups we also present data on the median for 
these groups.  
Figure A.1: Median wealth by age group  
2012$  
 
Source: Grattan analysis of ABS (2013c) 
 
Unsurprisingly median wealth is significantly lower than the mean, 
as a smaller number of households account for a disproportionate 
share of wealth. But the trend remains the same: older 
households grew their wealth faster than younger households. 
Figure A.2: Median savings rate by year and age group  
Savings as a proportion of disposable income (savings rate), per cent 
 
Source: ABS Household Expenditure Survey 2003-04 and 2009-10 
Median savings rates are very similar to the mean. This is 
because we removed the lowest and highest deciles in our earlier 
analysis. 
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Appendix B: Variations in income growth by gender and income level
Median incomes have increased over the last two decades for all 
age groups except the under 25s (Chapter 2). However, this 
obscures significant differences by gender and income level.  
Figure B.1: Annual incomes for women (gross) 
Wage, business and welfare income before tax, 50th percentile, 2011$ 
 
Notes: Between 1976 and 1986 the highest age bracket in the Census was 65+.The 75-84 
bracket was introduced in 1991 and 85+ bracket introduced in 2011. Assumes uniform 
distribution of income within age and income brackets. 
Source: ABS (Various years-a) 
Among those over 25, the income of women and men with high 
incomes increased significantly over the last two decades (Figure 
B.1 and Figure B.2). 
Figure B.2: Annual incomes for men with high incomes (gross) 
Wage, business and welfare income before tax, 80th percentile, 2011$ 
 
Notes: Between 1976 and 1986 the highest age bracket in the Census was 65.+The 75-84 
bracket was introduced in 1991 and 85+ bracket introduced in 2011. Assumes uniform 
distribution of income within age and income brackets. 
Source: ABS (Various years-a) 
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The incomes of men on medium incomes also grew over the 
period, although only for men aged over 35 (Figure B.3)  
Figure B.3: Annual incomes for men on medium incomes (gross) 
Wage, business and welfare income before tax, 50th percentile (2011$) 
 
 
Notes: Between 1976 and 1986 the highest age bracket in the Census was 65.+The 75-84 
bracket was introduced in 1991 and 85+ bracket introduced in 2011. Assumes uniform 
distribution of income within age and income brackets. 
Source: ABS (Various years-a) 
On the other hand the incomes of low income men of working age 
have not yet regained levels of the 1970s (Figure B.4). 
Figure B.4: Annual incomes for men on low incomes (gross) 
Wage, business and welfare income before tax, 20th percentile (2011$) 
 
Notes: Between 1976 and 1986 the highest age bracket in the Census was 65.+The 75-84 
bracket was introduced in 1991 and 85+ bracket introduced in 2011. Assumes uniform 
distribution of income within age and income brackets. 
Source: ABS (Various years-a) 
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Appendix C: Methodology for decomposing health spending  
In this appendix we set out the technical detail of how we 
calculate: 
1. per-person public health costs, by age-decade 
2. the split between demographic and non-demographic cost 
growth (from 1988-89 to 2009-10) 
Calculating “per-person costs” by age decade 
We set out in Figure 3.4 on p.15 our estimates of per person 
health spending over time by age group.  
The source data come from the ABS Fiscal Incidence Studies 
(FIS). These studies have been conducted roughly every five 
years in conjunction with the Household Expenditure Survey, 
since 1984.119 The aim of each FIS is to understand the impact 
that taxes and government expenditure have on household 
finances.120 The variable of interest here is the ABS’s estimate of 
the value of health services provided to each family (called 
‘UHLTOT’, and defined as ‘household total social transfers in kind 
for health’).  
There are two main challenges with turning these data into per-
person figures.  
                                            
119 Note that the 1984 FIS is not available in unit-record form, which is required 
for our calculation of spending by age. 
120 See Cat 6357.0 (various years), for a full description; e.g. 
http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/mf/6537.0  
The first is that people under the age of 15 are not specifically 
identified in the ‘person’ file of the FIS (i.e. they don’t have a 
record). Happily, the presence of children in a household is 
documented, so we add a record for each child. In years like 
2009-10 when the age of each child isn’t provided, we estimate it. 
We use data on the age of the eldest and youngest child in each 
household, and then fill in the gaps for households in which there 
are 3 or more children with a simple linear interpolation.  
By enumerating the data in terms of people rather than 
households (and by adding on children under 15) we’re left with a 
complete set of individuals, along with their ages and the ABS’s 
estimate of the how much each individual’s household received in 
health spending (for individual i, we call this value Ci). The 
challenge now is to apportion C among a household’s members. 
To do this, we use an algorithm that proceeds as follows121: 
A. First, we calculate the mean of C, by age. The mean cost 
associated with someone who is j years old is: 
ݓ௝ ൌ 	
∑ ܥ௜௃௜ୀଵ ܬ
ܬ  
where 1, ,J is defined as the set of individuals aged j 
                                            
121 This is a better approach than a regression (see 
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/pdf/development
/NTA_Manual_04Sept2013.pdf, p. 100). 
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B. These values are calculated for each individual, where wij is 
the weight associated with person i (of age j). wij can be 
conceptualised as weights. The weighted mean of C for 
each age j, then becomes our estimate of per-person health 
spending by age: 
݁ݏݐ݅݉ܽݐ ௝݁ ൌ 	∑
௖೔௪೔ೕ
∑ ௪೔ೕ಻೔సభ
௃
௜ୀଵ   
where once again, 1, ,J is defined as the set of individuals 
aged j. 
C. For each individual, we now substitute the value of wi with 
the estimate of per-person spending (estimatei). 
D. Steps B and C are iterated. 
E. We stop iterating when estimated per-person spending 
deviates by no more than a threshold d for any individual.122 
We now have estimates of per-person costs for each age-group 
reported in the FIS. To get a profile of spending by single-year-of-
age we: 
- Smooth the estimates using Friedman’s supersmoother 
package in R 
- Set all values above the age of 85 equal to the estimate of 
per-person spending for 85 year-olds (as the age-groups in 
the FIS rarely distinguish ages above this threshold) 
                                            
122 We define d as 50 cents per person, per week. 
To turn these single-year-of-age figures into an estimate of the 
average per-person cost for age decades, we weight the single-
year-of-age estimates with population distribution data in ABS Cat 
3101.0.123 
Finally, we convert to real dollars, by the Chain Price Index from 
ABS Cat. 5206.0. 
Splitting demographic and non-demographic cost growth  
Figure C.1: Split of demographic and non-demographic growth 
 FY1989 to FY2010 
 
To split health cost growth between demographic and non-
demographic factors, we first took real per-person spending by 
                                            
123 See Table 59: 
http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/DetailsPage/3101.0Mar%202014?
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single-year-of-age in 1989 (COST1989) and multiplied these figures 
by the proportion of the Australian population by age (POP1989). 
This gave the weighted-average cost per person (WAC): 
WACCOST89_POP89 = COST1989 * POP1989 = $1730 
We then did a similar thing for FY2010.  
Next, we calculated the weighted average cost for 2010, 
assuming there’d been no ageing (i.e. that the age-structure from 
1989 still applied): 
WACCOST89_POP2010 =  COST1989 * POP2010 = $3537 
The difference represents demographic cost growth: 
Non.Demographic Growth = $3537 - $1730 = $1807 
The demographic growth can then be calculated as a remainder, 
such that: 
WACCOST2010_POP2010 – WACCOST89_POP89  = Demographic Growth + 
Non.Demographic Growth 
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